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Abstract

The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are used to protect United
States (U.S.) military technologies. However, changes to ITAR export controls regarding
space technologies have had a major impact to the U.S. space industry. The literature
mentions a concern for the health of lower-tier firms because they are a major source of
innovation, but there is no additional information considering the effects of ITAR on
space innovation at those lower tiers. The purpose of this thesis was to explore the
implications of continuing the current ITAR restrictions with regard to innovation in the
space industry. This research used a three-part approach: Part I used personal interviews
to explore perceptions from the space enterprise. Part II was a secondary analysis of
previously collected data. Part III compared the results of Parts I and II to assess the
relationship between ITAR and innovation in the space industry. The analysis shows
there is no significant evidence that ITAR has a direct effect on space innovation.
However, the industry may see some secondary negative effects on innovation. This
thesis reveals a need to examine other second or third order effects of ITAR in economic
and political environments to advise current ITAR reform efforts.
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EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS
ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE

I. Introduction

The motivation for this research stems from a desire to understand how the U.S.
manages its National Security Space Enterprise. Personal observations from the
Schriever V Wargame of 2009 discovered some concerns with the policies, doctrine, and
laws our space leaders use to manage the enterprise. Early discussions revealed that the
topic is extremely complex and existing guidance documents are intentionally vague.
However, many of these discussions also included complaints about the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). These complaints led to the general question –
How does ITAR affect space?
The U.S. Government established ITAR to protect U.S. military technologies.
The current implementation of ITAR in the case of space technologies is hampering the
growth of the U.S. space industry in the global market. The U.S. maintains a lead in
space technology, but space innovation outside the U.S. has increased. Foreign
companies are now developing ITAR-free satellites, signaling a decreasing dependence
on U.S. technology. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the implications of
continuing the ITAR restrictions that may be detrimental to U.S. space capabilities. If
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ITAR has a negative effect on U.S. space innovation, future U.S. space solutions may not
be superior to foreign technologies. With less superior solutions available to meet future
requirements, the U.S. risks losing its long-standing space superiority. The U.S. must
continue to foster space innovation to enable U.S. companies to compete in the global
space market.

Background on ITAR and Space
Congress first implemented the International Traffic in Arms Regulations in 1976
under the Arms Export Control Act, found in Title 22, Chapter I of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Sections 120 through 130. The purpose of ITAR is to prevent sensitive
technology from reaching parties hostile to the U.S. As stated in ITAR, Executive Order
11958 delegated authority to the Department of State to regulate the export and import of
defense articles and defense services (U.S. Congress 2009) which may include hardware,
technologies, and services. The Department of Defense (DoD) captures and manages
these items in the U.S. Munitions List (USML). Furthermore, two categories in the
USML compose nearly all applicable material for space, Category IV – Launch Vehicles
and Category VIII – Spacecraft (U.S. Congress 2009). When first enacted, this collection
of regulations was extremely important to protect military technology, especially space
technology, from leaking out of the country to hostile governments such as our Cold War
rival, the Soviet Union. ITAR protected all military space systems because each system
was unique to the mission for which it was designed.
With the conclusion of the Cold War, the U.S. began to look more at international
space ventures. To that end, in 1988, President Ronald Reagan “lifted the ban on the use
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of Chinese launch vehicles for commercial satellites” and President George HW Bush
“made a similar decision with regard to Russia.” In line with the Presidents’ willingness
to trade with the two rivals and increasing openness to international space ventures, in
1992 “the State Department transferred jurisdiction of some commercial communications
satellites to the Department of Commerce” (Space Foundation 2008). By 1996,
commercial communications satellites were fully transferred “under the purview of
Commerce’s less restrictive [Commerce Control List] CCL” (Taylor 2007). However, it
should be noted that “the State Department continued to control the related
communications technologies and the rest of the space items on the USML remained
under its jurisdiction” (Space Foundation 2008). By taking such an action, the U.S.
government was working to reduce the limitation of ITAR on exporting technology by
attempting to separate non-military space technology from military.
In 1995 and 1996, investigations of two failed launches using the People’s
Republic of China’s (PRC) lift vehicles to carry U.S. commercial satellites led to a breach
of ITAR as discovered by the Cox Commission in 1996. Below is a summary of the
incident and the commission’s findings:
Following the catastrophic launch failure of a Chinese Long March 3B rocket
carrying the U.S.-built Intelsat 708 satellite, an Independent Review Committee
composed of Loral and Hughes Space & Communications engineers met with
PRC engineers to review the failure analysis performed by the Chinese. The
Independent Review Committee took issue with the findings of the report, and
therefore issued their own Preliminary Report, documenting two other potential
failure points and recommending further testing.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), evidence suggests
that the Independent Review Committee very likely led the PRC to discover the
true source of failure of the rocket. The DOD also concluded that “Loral and
Hughes committed a serious export control violation by virtue of having
performed a defense service without a license…” (U.S. House of Representatives
1999)
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Because of the commission’s findings, the companies involved were fined a total of 65
million dollars. Furthermore, the Department of Commerce returned jurisdiction to the
Department of State as “all satellites and satellite technologies were once again placed on
the USML and exports were governed by ITAR” (Space Foundation 2008). Since this
transition of jurisdiction, the government has not significantly altered ITAR in terms of
space technology.

Importance of the Industrial Base
Several studies have researched the effects of ITAR on the U.S. industrial base
because the DoD holds a strong interest in understanding the state of the defense
industrial base. This resource is vital to maintain the ability to produce military
capabilities and provide surge support when needed. Evidence of the importance the
DoD places on the Defense Industrial Base is seen in examples such as the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (DUSD-IP), the Annual
Industrial Capabilities Report submitted by DoD to Congress, the Defense Contract
Management Agency’s Industrial Analysis Center, and established councils at the joint
level and service level. All of these examples have the primary goal of maintaining
awareness of issues affecting the industrial base so that the DoD may leverage the
industrial base effectively to meet warfighter needs. The councils and reports study and
address issues such as globalization; manufacturing and engineering expertise; eroding
U.S. leadership in science, technology, and engineering; the aging workforce; and DoD
policies and requirements.
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Space Industrial Base
The U.S. continues to lead the world in space technology development, but the
current domestic demand is not sufficient to sustain the U.S. space industry (AFRL
2009). Access to the global space market will result in growth for the U.S. space
industry. However, any transaction with a foreign country involving space technology
requires ITAR approval. This is typically not a problem for large companies with
established export programs. There is, however, a greater impact to small firms due to
the resources required for registration and maintaining a compliance infrastructure.
Because smaller companies are considered to be a major source of innovation (Space
Foundation 2008), the combination of barriers to their participation in the global market
and the low domestic demand for space technologies may result in less opportunities for
space innovation in the U.S. This could lead to the conclusion that ITAR is stifling U.S.
space innovation. While space innovation may be suffering in the U.S., space innovation
is increasing overseas, and the U.S.’s dominance in space technology may be losing its
edge. Companies outside the U.S. are now developing technologies and components
traditionally supplied by the U.S., thus creating more competition. ITAR raises barriers
for competition in the global space market. One reason for barriers raised by ITAR is
that the export license process takes too long. Foreign governments are able to take
advantage of these barriers to keep economic benefits within their own nations. For
example, they may intentionally set shorter deadlines for contract proposals which they
know U.S. companies will not be able to meet due to the lengthy ITAR licensing process
(Space Foundation 2008).
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Problem and Purpose Statement
Since 1999, when all space technologies returned to the protection of ITAR,
several published articles and studies address the effects of those international restrictions
on the U.S. Space Industrial Base (SIB). Statements and comments refer to a concern for
lower-tier firms because they are a major source of innovation. The literature, as
reviewed in Chapter II, provides no additional information considering the effects of
ITAR on space innovation at lower tiers. Therefore, this research investigates the
following questions:
1. What are the effects of ITAR restrictions on innovation in the U.S. SIB?
2. Are there any indications that innovation in the SIB is declining since stricter
ITAR restrictions were imposed in 1999? If so, what are they?
3. What is the perception of the health of innovation in the SIB from space leaders in
government and industry?
This research explores the connection between ITAR and its effects on space
innovation. This study does not detail various flaws of ITAR or recommend changes to
existing export policies; however, it considers potential unintended consequences or
second-order effects of ITAR with a focus on innovation in the U.S. space industry.

Methodology
This study evaluates the research questions using a combination of qualitative and
quantitative analysis. The overall framework includes three parts (1) data collection
through interviews of government and industry representatives, (2) a secondary analysis
of existing data, from a 2007 space industrial base survey by the Department of
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Commerce, and (3) a comparison analysis between the interviews and the existing data.
The methods used include data coding and theme development for interviews and
secondary analysis of data from the survey.

Summary
This chapter introduced the topic of this thesis with background information on
ITAR and its connection to the space industry, a summary of the importance of the
industrial base, and a look at the space industrial base. Chapter II presents an in depth
literature review of national policies relevant to space and export controls, commissioned
studies along with articles and editorials looking at ITAR and the space industrial base,
and relevant innovation concepts. Chapter III provides a detailed description of the
research methodology that covers a three-part framework, including data collection
through interviews, a secondary analysis of existing data, and a comparison analysis
between the interviews and the existing data. Chapter IV presents the results of the data
analysis. Finally, Chapter V provides conclusions and outlines recommendations for
further research.
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II. Literature Review

This chapter presents the relevant supporting information for this research found
in existing literature based on four sub-topics: Policy, Commissioned Studies, Articles
and Editorials, and Innovation. The final paragraphs outline the gap in the literature on
which this research focuses.

Policy
The United Nations (UN), realizing the great prospects of space exploration for
mankind, drafted a treaty in 1967, commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty, to
ensure that the exploration and use of outer space would be for peaceful purposes and for
the benefit of all people and countries irrespective of their economic or scientific
development (United Nations 1967). The treaty also encourages international
cooperation for scientific investigation in outer space. The development of technologies
to explore and use space requires significant investment of financial and intellectual
capital. Only a few governments committed to this investment at the beginning of the
space race. However, additional nations (not as economically developed) have become
players in the space business by forming consortia to combine their limited resources and
benefit from the continuously increasing prospects of space.
The U.S. established the National Space Policy (NSP) in 1978 and periodically
updates it as political and economic climates change. The release date of the most recent
version of the NSP is June 28, 2010; however, this research references the 2006 version

8

(National Space Policy 2006). The NSP continuously aligns with the United Nations’
treaties and principles on outer space. Moreover, the NSP outlines additional principles
to strengthen and secure the nation’s space leadership. One of the guiding principles
found in this policy states that the U.S. “is committed to encouraging and facilitating a
growing and entrepreneurial U.S. commercial space sector” (National Space Policy
2006). This statement recognizes the need to encourage space innovation as a significant
contribution to the U.S. economy. Furthermore, specific fundamental goals in the NSP
emphasize the U.S. desire to remain a major player in space. The first goal relates to the
need to maintain the U.S. space industrial base to “ensure that space capabilities are
available in time to further U.S. national security…” Another goal is to “Enable a
dynamic, globally competitive domestic commercial space sector in order to promote
innovation, strengthen U.S. leadership, and protect national, homeland, and economic
security…” This goal directly recognizes the connection between innovation and global
competitiveness. In addition, the NSP acknowledges the importance of international
cooperation “on space activities that are of mutual benefit and that further the peaceful
exploration and use of space…”
Finally, the NSP specifically recognizes a need for effective export policies. This
concept is crucial to supporting the fundamental goals of the NSP relating to innovation
and international cooperation. When reviewing export license requests, “space-related
exports that are currently available or are planned to be available in the global
marketplace shall be considered favorably.” However, since the U.S. considers space
capabilities to be vital to its national interest, exports of “sensitive or advanced technical
data, systems, technologies, and components, shall be approved only rarely…” (National
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Space Policy 2006). This statement illustrates the need for the U.S. to balance national
security with economic security to remain a global space leader.

Commissioned Studies
From 2007 through 2009, there have been at least eight studies that examined the
health of the U.S. industrial base in general and the effects of ITAR specifically on the
SIB. Key findings agree across these studies with regard to the space industry. Large
defense contractors in the SIB are healthy, but there is some concern for key lower-tier
suppliers (CSIS 2008; AFRL 2009). AFRL’s 2009 Industrial Base Assessment points out
that demand for global commercial and domestic military space systems is strong through
at least 2012 (AFRL 2009). Upgrade and replacement efforts for nearly all on-orbit
assets currently under-way in the national security space sector contribute to the “good”
financial health of top-tier manufacturers in the SIB (CSIS 2008). However, export
control requirements present a significant barrier to competing in foreign markets while
there is an insufficient domestic demand to keep all suppliers operating at efficient
capacity (AFRL 2009). Abbey and Lane (2009) show there is a direct correlation
between export policies, cost of compliance, and financial health of smaller suppliers.
Furthermore, domestic sources are diminishing or are at-risk for key items such as solar
arrays and radiation-hardened electronics (AFRL 2009). U.S. space firms need to expand
to the global community in order to survive.
The concern for key lower-tier suppliers directly relates to a concern for
innovation in the SIB. The Space Foundation’s 2008 study on ITAR and the U.S. space
industry states that lower-tier companies are a major source of innovation. Lower-tier
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companies invest a much higher percentage of internal funds as a percent of sales on
space Research & Development (R&D) than larger aerospace contractors who rely more
on government funding for research (Taylor 2007; NSSO 2008). Growth in R&D
expenditures was seen primarily in lower-tier companies as an investment in innovation
to remain competitive (Taylor 2007). However, the Institute for Defense Analyses’ 2007
study mentions that U.S. commercial firms are reluctant to engage in R&D activities for
the DoD because of potential Department of State restrictions (Van Atta et al. 2007).
Another report states that ITAR discourages companies from supplying their best
technologies to the DoD so that they can compete in commercial and international
markets for potentially higher sales volume and profits (OUSD-ATL 2009).
All the space industry studies agree that ITAR inhibits the ability to compete or
participate in the global space community (Taylor 2007; CSIS 2008; NSSO 2008; Space
Foundation 2008; AFRL 2009). The uncertainty of ITAR processes and processing times
impacts the space industry’s confidence to compete in foreign markets (CSIS 2008).
Lengthy processing times for license requests are a major cause for loss of foreign sales
(Taylor 2007; Space Foundation 2008). Export control compliance costs are a significant
burden for lower-tier firms (Taylor 2007; NSSO 2008; Space Foundation 2008). “As a
percent of foreign sales, the cost burden on Tier 3 companies is nearly eight times that of
Tier 1 firms” (CSIS 2008). Tier definitions are Tier 1 – prime contractors, Tier 2 –
subcontractors, and Tier 3 – commodity suppliers (Taylor 2007). ITAR makes it difficult
to hire the best talent and also inhibits access to foreign technology (NSSO 2008). The
U.S. Munitions List (USML), which lists the products and services that ITAR protects,
includes technologies that are already commercially available in other countries (NSSO
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2008; Space Foundation 2008). Specifically, the USML classifies commercial
communications satellites as “munitions.” As a result, satellite manufactures must adhere
to ITAR licensing requirements when developing products that include any components
also found on the protected communications satellites – these components may already be
openly available outside the U.S.
In some cases, ITAR has encouraged the rise of foreign space capabilities.
Foreign competitors take advantage of U.S. export controls (Taylor 2007; Space
Foundation 2008; Abbey and Lane 2009; AFRL 2009). They may intentionally set
shorter deadlines they know U.S. companies will not be able to meet due to the lengthy
ITAR licensing process (Space Foundation 2008). In response to continued problems
with U.S. trade restrictions, there is a growing ITAR-free movement where foreign
companies are funding the development of satellite components typically acquired from
the U.S. (CSIS 2008; Abbey and Lane 2009) – “they are choosing to avoid dealing with
U.S. export controls by not using American-made parts” (Abbey and Lane 2009). This is
evidence that the intent of space export controls – to prevent sensitive technology from
reaching parties hostile to the U.S. – is not being achieved (CSIS 2008).
Because of increasing foreign competition in the space industry, the U.S. share of
global space markets is steadily declining (Taylor 2007; CSIS 2008; AFRL 2009; Futron
Corporation 2009). From 1999 to 2006, the U.S. share of satellite manufacturing for all
communication satellites sales decreased 20% and for geosynchronous orbit
communication satellites the decrease was 10% (Taylor 2007). A 2009 study sponsored
by the Satellite Industry Association indicates that the U.S. share of manufacturing
revenues fell from 41% to 29% of the world total from 2007 to 2008 (Futron Corporation
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2009). This steady decline in the U.S. share of global space markets is most likely due to
foreign companies choosing not to buy from the U.S. due to export controls and having
U.S. components and technology designed out of satellite systems (CSIS 2008).
Finally, U.S. space export control policy is not in agreement with the national
space policy (CSIS 2008). A study conducted by the Center for Strategic & International
Studies shows specific examples where some elements of ITAR are in conflict with the
goals of the NSP. Table 1 captures the findings. These findings further emphasize the
idea that the U.S. is not achieving the strategic intent of space export controls and there is
a continuing need to balance economic security with national security.

Table 1: Conflicts between ITAR and U.S. National Space Policy
Among the unintended consequences of ITAR:

Corresponding section in U.S. National Space
Policy:
“space-related exports that are currently available
or are planned to be available in the global
marketplace shall be considered favorably”
“Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain
U.S. advantage and support defense and
intelligence transformation; … Develop
capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of
action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom
of action to adversaries”
“Refrain from conducting activities that preclude,
deter, or compete with U.S. commercial space
activities, unless required by national security or
public safety”

USML not consistent with current assessment of
which space technologies should be controlled
U.S. space export control regime does not match its
goals of both enabling cooperation with allies and
denial of capabilities to opponents. The current
regime does not provide policy makers with the
nuance or flexibility needed to serve the National
Space Policy.
Satellites and their components placed on USML
with intent to limit spread of space technology.
Unintended consequences: encouraged proliferation
of space capabilities; failed to prevent rise of other
space powers; impacted U.S. competitiveness
Adverse industrial/technological impact to U.S.
ITAR implementation introduces a friction for U.S.
companies competing in the global market, as much
as $600 million a year, which in turn feeds space
development that the U.S. is not involved in
The continuation of our legacy of beneficial
collaboration with foreigners has been impeded, as
has our ability to do anomaly resolution

“A robust science, technology, and industrial base
is critical for U.S. space capabilities… Use U.S.
commercial space capabilities and services to the
maximum practical extent”

“Encourage international cooperation … on space
activities that are of mutual benefit and that further
the peaceful exploration and use of space, as well
as to advance national security, homeland security,
and foreign policy objectives”
Source: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2008
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Articles and Editorials
Several articles are available that address the issue of ITAR in relation to the
space industry. These articles primarily speak of the hardships companies in the U.S.
space industry have faced since commercial satellites returned to the USML in 1999.
Opinions are consistent across all the articles.
The main concern is that instead of protecting U.S. national security interests, the
export policy has closed off a profitable export industry. “The result has been the
deliberate development by overseas manufacturers of … devices and systems that are the
equivalent of American technologies … not subject to ITAR” (Wheatley 2009). Even in
the case of U.S. dual-use technologies, export restrictions do not have any impact on
what other nations are able to sell (Dinerman 2005). Dinerman (2008) poses a relevant
question: How does a superpower balance the needs of its national security system and its
need to trade? The majority of the articles reiterate the fact that ITAR has negatively
affected the U.S.’s participation in the global space market. Foust (2005) points out that
since oversight of satellite technology exports was transferred to the State Department, “it
has become far more difficult for U.S. companies to sell satellites and satellite
components to customers outside the [U.S.], even to friendly nations such as Canada and
Britain.” Global competition has grown and U.S. companies are finding it difficult to
compete with foreign companies offering ITAR-free satellites. Contractors around the
globe have the option of acquiring equivalent technologies from companies outside the
U.S. Wheatley (2009) provides two specific examples: (1) Canada has specifically cited
ITAR as a reason for selecting European satellite builders and (2) EADS Sodern, a
French company, is phasing out its American supplier base.

14

According to Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA), even the intelligence
community is finding it difficult to source satellite-related components domestically
(Space Politics 2009). This leads the reader to question the superiority of U.S. space
technologies and components when compared to what is available in the global market.
The most popular recommendation to remedy the frustrations of the U.S. space
industry is to review and revise the USML to exclude technologies which are readily
available as commercial-off-the-shelf technologies around the globe (Kusiolek 2008;
Boucher 2009). Despite their widespread commercial availability, the USML classifies
communications and other commercial satellites as “weapons systems” (Dinerman 2008).
“Screws, lithium-ion batteries, simple rivets – if they have a defined space application,
their export is banned, or subject to ITAR’s burdensome licensing applications and
controls” (Wheatley 2009).
Another suggestion is to re-establish a multilateral Cold War organization called
the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) (Dinerman 2008;
Knes 2010). The CoCom brought together 17 member states, including the U.S., its
NATO allies, Japan, and Australia, in an informal setting where they could agree on what
exports they would allow. “The organization’s extreme discretion and its lack of a
formal legal structure insured that no nation could publicly lose face” (Dinerman 2008).
The main point of Dinerman’s suggestion is to find a way for the U.S. to treat its close
allies as trusted friends with regard to trade.
The lengthy and unpredictable ITAR process takes much of the blame for foreign
contractors phasing out U.S. suppliers for satellites and satellite components. Pierre
Chao, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that
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interest in ITAR-free satellites is prompted “by the uncertainty embodied with the U.S.
ITAR system” (Space Politics 2009). This uncertainty refers to delays in getting
approvals for export licenses and related agreements. There is acknowledgement of some
progress with the ITAR process. For example, the State Department is already starting to
process export license applications more rapidly (Space Politics 2009) – requiring
decisions to be made within 60 days of the application (Dinerman 2008).
The literature proposed several recommendations to fix this lengthy process. One
recommendation considers a two-tier approach that would treat exports to allied countries
in a more expeditious manner (Foust 2005). This would be a way to trade with close
allies while treating them as trusted friends. Another recommendation is to allow space
parts for systems that have already been exported to close allies to be shipped without
having to go through the ITAR process (Dinerman 2008). In addition, there are
complaints that the State Department must enhance the transparency of the export control
process. This should include explanatory notes for USML categories as well as public
release of the results of Commodity Jurisdiction requests (Boucher 2009). Still the cost
of compliance weighs heavily on many U.S. firms, particularly small companies,
resulting in reduced profit margins to cope with ITAR (Dinerman 2008).
Looking beyond commercial satellites, Foust (2005) raises concerns for ITAR’s
effect on the up-and-coming space tourism industry. With the uncertainty of possible
licensing requirements, U.S. companies with designs for commercial space vehicles are
unable to share their designs with foreign companies looking to venture into the space
tourism business. Foust (2005) says a worst-case scenario would be that ITAR could
restrict who could fly on future space-tourism vehicles. Companies may need to obtain a
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license for every non-U.S. passenger because some technical information may need to be
shared with passengers for safety reasons. This could make it difficult for U.S.
companies to succeed, pushing the space tourism market overseas (Foust 2005).

Innovation
Defining Innovation.
The literature defines innovation in various ways. It is not simply the creation of
a new idea. The Cambridge dictionary (2010) defines innovation as “(the use of) a new
idea or method.” Chesbrough (2003) says it is an “invention implemented and taken to
market.” Bessant and Tidd (2007) outline three core themes of innovation, which are
generating new ideas, selecting the good ones, and implementing them. However, no
discussion on innovation is complete without reference to Josef Schumpeter. In his 1934
publication, The Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter (1934) defines
economic innovation using five categories:
1. The introduction of a new good or of a new quality of a good
2. The introduction of a new method of production
3. The opening of a new market
4. Development of a new source of supply of raw materials
5. The new organization of an industry
Rogers (1998) refers to several authors to establish a definition for innovation as a
foundation for measuring innovation. In addition to innovation describing something
new or improved, Rogers (1998) refers to a survey used by the Australia Bureau of
Statistics (1996) in which innovation is defined as “any new or substantially improved
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good or service which has been commercialized, or any new or substantially improved
process used for the commercial production of goods and services.” The key in this
definition is the commercialization of something new or improved. Rogers (1998) also
emphasizes that new knowledge, products, or services are not innovation until they add
value through the productive incorporation into an enterprise’s activities. This idea is
derived from the Business Council of Australia (1993) which defines innovation as
“something that is new or significantly improved, done by an enterprise to create added
value either directly for the enterprise or indirectly for its customers.” Adding a
timeframe to innovation, Rogers references a definition used by Phillips (1997) in which
a firm is considered to be “innovative if it introduced at least one new or substantially
improved product or process in a three year period.” For the purpose of this paper,
innovation is a new idea for a new or improved product or process, implemented within a
three-year period, and adds value to an enterprise.
Measuring Innovation.
The concept of measuring innovation is important to empirically prove or test
innovation management concepts. However, it has been difficult to find a record of wellestablished measures for innovation. A search of the literature reveals “a diversity of
approaches, prescriptions and practices that can be confusing and contradictory” (Adams,
Bessant, and Phelps 2006). Some articles refer to proxies that have been used in the past,
but later articles point out flaws in using those proxies. Measuring innovation can be a
challenge because of the broad nature of activities in the innovation process (Rogers
1998).
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Typically, in measuring innovation, there is a distinction between inputs to
innovation activity and outputs from innovation activity. Inputs relate to resources and
include finance, human and physical resources, and the generation of new ideas (Adams
et al. 2006). Outputs relate to measuring the success of a firm using econometric
techniques or other variables resulting from innovative activities (Rogers 1998). Table 2
is a summary of measures and proxies used to measure innovation in a firm. The
following paragraphs address these measures.

Table 2: Measures of Innovation
Input Measures

Output Measures

Expenditure for R&D
Firm performance
Intellectual Property Statistics/Acquisition of
Intellectual Property Statistics
technology from others (e.g. patents, licenses)
Intangible assets (include goodwill and capitalized
Introduction of new/improved products/processes
R&D)
Expenditure on tooling-up, industrial engineering,
Percentage of sales from new/improved
and manufacturing start-up associated with new
products/processes
products/processes
Expenditure on marketing new products/processes
Market Share
Expenditure on training for new/changed
Strategic success: growth in market share over a
products/processes
period of time
Managerial and organizational change
Sources: Rogers 1998, Tables 1 & 2; Bessant & Tidd 2007

Expenditures for R&D is the most frequently used proxy for the level of
innovative effort in a firm. This is a well-understood figure using readily available dollar
amounts. It is typically expressed as a ratio between expenditure and some expression of
output (Adams et al. 2006) or as a ratio of R&D to value added (Tidd 2001). Some
examples include total expenditure, expenditure as a proportion of sales or revenues, and
expenditure by item (patent, organizational department, innovation or scientist) (Adams
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et al. 2006). Rogers (1998) points out that there may be issues with using R&D as a
proxy for innovation because of varying definitions of R&D. His concern is that the
definition for R&D may be too general, “the outcome of which is new knowledge, with
or without a specific practical application,” and does not coincide with the definition for
innovation, which would require some practical application. However, he suggests that
commercial firms would aim R&D at creating innovations for commercial exploitation.
Tidd (2001) suggests that R&D activities have a significant positive effect on the number
of new products introduced as well as value added, which can be considered output
measures of innovation.
Adams, Bessant, and Phelps raise other concerns for using R&D as a proxy for
innovation in their 2006 review of innovation management measurement. First, they
argue that R&D is not an adequate proxy because it is only one of several inputs into the
innovation process. They also argue that, even though adequate funding is a critical input
into the innovation process, high levels of R&D funding may not be evidence of good
innovation because they may mask process inefficiencies. Another concern these authors
have is that small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as service industries, do not have
formal R&D activities, in which case, R&D would not be an effective measure.
Knowledge management is also an important aspect of innovation. “Ideas are the
raw materials for innovation” (Adams et al. 2006). Assessing the value of a firm’s
intellectual property (IP) is a way to measure its accumulated knowledge. Intellectual
property can be either an input or an output to the innovation process. It is considered an
output because the process of applying for IP rights implies that a company has created
some new knowledge that needs to be protected (Rogers 1998). As outlined by Rogers
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(1998), IP includes patents, trademarks, design data, and the value of intangible assets.
He defines intangible assets to be “an overall valuation for goodwill, capitalised past
R&D, as well as valuations of any holdings of patents, trademarks and licenses” (Rogers
1998). Bessant and Tidd (2007) also include scientific papers in the list of IP. Counting
the numbers or values of patents is the most frequently used approach and has been
widely accepted as a proxy measure for innovation (Adams et al. 2006). The number of
applications for patents can be a proxy for innovation output, because it represents a new
idea to the firm even though another firm may have already registered the idea (Rogers
1998). Counting the number of patents granted may compensate for the weaknesses of
R&D statistics (Tidd 2001).
Rogers (1998) explains that using patents as a measure can be a problem for two
reasons. First, the existence of a patent does not necessarily mean the idea was used
commercially. Second, not all ideas can or will be patented, either for legal reasons or to
prevent competitors from using this knowledge to their advantage. The acquisition of
technology from others in the form of patents or licenses can be an input measure. There
is limited study on the use of trademarks and design data as indicators of innovation;
trademarks usually group together with patents. The value of intangible assets can be
used as a measure of past innovation while the change in intangible assets between two
periods can be used as a proxy for current innovation effort (Rogers 1998).
Rogers (1998) also addresses additional inputs to consider when measuring
innovation in a firm. In many cases, new products or processes may require additional
expenditures for tooling-up, industrial engineering, and manufacturing. Inputs to
innovation also include marketing and training expenditures associated with new
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products. These inputs are crucial to innovation because of their contribution to
developing and extracting value from new ideas. Lastly, changes to a firm’s managerial
methods and organizational structure may be an input to innovation. This is difficult to
measure and has typically been a yes-no response in survey questions that ask if there
have been such changes (Rogers 1998).
Several options are available for measuring the outputs of innovation. Intellectual
property is one measure mentioned earlier. In addition, Bessant and Tidd (2007) offer
three groups of output measures. First, a firm can measure operational or process
elements through customer satisfaction surveys to indicate improvements in quality or
flexibility. Next, some output measures, such as cost of product, market share, and
quality performance, can be compared across sectors or enterprises. Last, measures of
strategic success, including growth in revenue or market share and improved profitability,
can in part be attributed directly or indirectly to innovation.
Rogers (1998) describes how outputs can be measured by the number of new or
improved products or processes introduced by a firm or by the percentage of sales from
those new or improved products or processes. Counting the number of new or improved
products is only a “crude” indicator of a firm’s level of innovation. Estimating this
information as a percentage of sales accounted for by new products, improved products,
and unchanged products refines the measure as an assessment of past innovation. The
expectation is that highly innovative firms would have a higher percentage of sales from
new and improved products.
The key output measure of innovation is the success of a firm. Proxies to measure
firm success include profits, revenue growth, share performance, market capitalization,
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and productivity (Rogers 1998). Many of the measures mentioned earlier are only
partial measures of a firm’s overall innovation ability. Using econometric techniques to
relate the various innovation measures to the overall performance of a firm can correct
for this. This is most commonly done with R&D data, using market value and
productivity to quantify firm success (Rogers 1998).
The space industry thrives on the expectation of continuous technology
advancements, thus depending on a substantial level of innovation. For the purpose of
this research, the innovation measures described above are most applicable to technology
development. These are R&D expenditures, IP, the number of new products introduced,
percentage of sales or profits from new products, U.S. market share of the space industry,
and global market share data over several years.
R&D expenditures are an appropriate measure because many developments for
the space industry tend to be unique to meet specific customer needs or mission
requirements. However, this research will consider other measures of innovation along
with R&D expenditures in consideration of the concerns expressed above. Intellectual
property is also an appropriate measure. Realizing that not all firms have the same level
of importance for IP, for those that make IP a priority, this measure will be a good
indication of innovative activities. The number of new products introduced along with
the percentage of sales or profits from new products would be good measures for some
firms in the space industry due to the uniqueness of mission requirements – these firms
would introduce more products that are new. However, for those firms that provide
standard components not requiring unique developments, it is unlikely that data on new
products introduced will be as prevalent. Finally, since the purpose is to explore the
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effects of ITAR export policy on innovation, this research considers the U.S. market
share of the space industry in relation to the rest of the world, rather than looking at
individual firms. Reviewing global market share data over a period of several years may
provide a partial indication of continued innovation activities in the U.S. space industry.

Gap in Literature
Several SIB studies express a concern for lower-tier firms because they are a
major source of innovation. However, there is no additional information considering the
effects of ITAR on space innovation at those lower tiers. The studies have done a
thorough job in describing the difficulties faced by many firms in the U.S. SIB. These
difficulties include a lengthy licensing process, cost of ITAR compliance, and generally,
the ability to compete in the global space market. The articles and editorials further
enumerate the shortcomings of ITAR and complaints from industry on the U.S.’s ability
to balance national security with economic security. However, there is no further
mention of the effects on innovation. This research does not intend to detail various
flaws of ITAR, but to explore how some unintended consequences of ITAR may be
affecting innovation in the U.S. Space Industrial Base.
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III. Methodology

This chapter provides a description of the methodology for this research that
includes both qualitative and quantitative components.

Overall Research Framework
The overall approach used for this study, illustrated in Figure 1, combines
qualitative and quantitative elements. The literature review for this research investigated
key concepts and existing studies regarding ITAR and the U.S. space industrial base as
well as indicators of innovation. This effort, combined with personal experience in Air
Force space acquisition, suggested some focus areas for the current research and helped
to form the research questions. The main area requiring further understanding was the
link between ITAR and innovation in the U.S. space industry, of which there appears to
be no additional documented discussion. As a result, an initial exploratory study
provided insight into and comprehension of the proposed link between ITAR and space
innovation. This led to the development of a three-part approach: Part I used personal
interviews to explore perceptions from the space enterprise, Part II was a secondary
analysis of previously collected data, and Part III compared the results of Parts I and II to
develop conclusions about the relationship between ITAR and innovation in the space
industry. Using derivative data for Part II poses some concern with the danger of
incorrectly interpreting the information collected for a different purpose. However, the

25

exploratory nature of this research allows for the use of derivative data to provide insight
into the situation, rather than provide definitive conclusions.

Figure 1: Overall Research Framework

Part I: Perceptions from the Space Enterprise
Interviews.
The first portion of this research gathered information regarding key themes
representing perspectives from various participants in the U.S. space industry, including
small business representatives and senior government space leaders. Data was gathered
through interviews, using a set of specific questions to maintain the appropriate context
for the interviews. However, respondents had the opportunity to discuss their thoughts in
an open-ended format in order to allow for the inclusion of additional relevant
information that not specifically requested. Interviews were conducted by telephone and
in-person as opportunities allowed. The following questions applied to all respondents:
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1. How do you or your business participate in the Space Industrial Base?
2. What are your perceptions of the effects of ITAR on innovation in the space
industry?
3. How do you expect the U.S. space industry will evolve with the current system of
export control policy?
4. What other factors do you think affect innovation in the space industry?
5. If you were king/queen for a day, what would you change?
6. Do you have any additional comments regarding ITAR and the space industry?
When speaking with industry representatives, interviews included the following
questions:
7. What are your perceptions of your business’s innovation capability for space
technology?
a. Since 1999, for how many patents has your business applied? Been
granted?
b. Since 1999, how many technical papers have members in your business
published?
c. Since 1999, how many new ideas/products has your business introduced
into the space market?
d. Since 1999, on average, what was your percent of sales/profits from new
products?
8. What are your perceptions of the effects of ITAR on your business’s innovation
capability for space technology?
The goal of formulating these questions was to solicit the respondents’ perceptions of
how ITAR and innovation in the space industry may be related. The information
gathered from the literature review was the basis for developing the interview questions.
The survey questions used for Part II of this research were not available until after the
interview questions were developed. The consolidated interview instrument is included
in Appendix A.
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Sampling method.
The target population for this research was any individual or group that
participates in the U.S. space industry through some kind of interaction with ITAR. This
range of participation includes government agencies and organizations for policy
formulation and implementation, government customers of the space industry, and
individuals and firms in the space industry that are subject to ITAR in their businesses.
The National Security Space Office (NSSO) provided guidance in selecting interview
subjects for this research. Because the NSSO collaborates across the defense,
intelligence, civil, and commercial communities, the office is in a unique position to
bring together senior government officials and invited guests for the Space Industrial
Base Council to facilitate communication with industry leaders. Also, the NSSO is
committed to providing expert products and advice for space industrial base development
and assessing programs across National Security Space, DoD, the Intelligence
Community, and civil, commercial, and international space (NSSO 2010). The NSSO’s
focus on cross-space enterprise issues ensured consideration of the entire target
population.
Sampling of the space industry focused on second- and third-tier firms because
these levels of industry are a primary source of innovation. Industry participants were
randomly selected from a list of lower-tier firms used in the NSSO 2008 study, “Barriers
to Entry and Sustainability in the U.S. Space Industry.” Purposive sampling was the
method used to select government participants based on recommendations from the
NSSO to guarantee representation from the appropriate government agencies because of
the need for a specialized population (Neuman 2006; Trochim & Donnelly 2008).
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Snowball sampling allowed a more comprehensive representation of the network of
people or organizations involved in ITAR and space issues (Neuman 2006; Trochim &
Donnelly 2008). The following organizations participated in this study:
-

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)

-

Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce

-

Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs Office, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

-

Defense Technology Security Administration, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy

-

Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State

-

National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS),
NOAA

-

National Security Space Office

-

Office of Space Commercialization, NOAA

-

Space & Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command

The above list does not include the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) because, generally, ITAR allows for treatment that is more
permissive for U.S. Government agencies. NASA is able to apply several exemptions
listed in ITAR. The procedural requirements document for the NASA Export Control
Program (NASA 2007) includes a chapter which specifically addresses ITAR
procedures. The chapter lists eleven exemptions from ITAR that are relevant to NASA
activities. One specific example refers to Section 126.4 of the ITAR, which refers to
shipments by or for U.S. Government agencies. Paragraph (a) of this section allows for
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the temporary export of any defense articles by or for any U.S. government agency for
official use by that agency, or for carrying out foreign assistance or cooperative projects
(U.S. Congress 2009). ITAR does not restrict NASA as much as it does companies in the
commercial industry.
This research contains 17 interviews. Seven of these represent lower-tier firms,
while the remaining ten represent government or other space organizations.
Qualitative data coding.
Content analysis was the method used for analyzing the data collected through
interviews by transcribing and organizing the raw responses into conceptual categories
using thematic analysis (Trochim & Donnelly 2008). The analysis used latent coding
(Neuman 2006) to extract key themes from the interviews and develop an overall
understanding of the existing perceptions of the state of innovation in the U.S. space
industry. This coding enabled recognition of similar evidence in the quantitative data.
Chapter IV contains the categories and combined data.

Part II: Space Innovation Survey Analysis
The intent of the second portion of this research was to obtain quantitative
information based on relevant industry data. This was accomplished through an analysis
of data previously collected from the U.S. space industry with a focus on indicators of
innovation in the U.S. space industry from 2003 to 2006.
Data source.
The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) collected
the survey data used for this research. In 2006, BIS, in coordination with the U.S. Air
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Force, the NSSO, NOAA, NASA and others, conducted a survey of the U.S. space
industry. The purpose of the survey was to analyze the health and competitiveness of the
space industry. Relevant to the current research, the BIS included an analysis of the
effects of foreign competition and export controls on the industry’s ability to meet
defense and commercial market demands. The survey had a 74% response rate with
inputs received and verified from 202 space industry companies/business units.
Respondents were characterized using tier levels where prime contractors were Tier 1,
subcontractors were Tier 2, and commodity suppliers were Tier 3. Tier 1 includes
companies that sell end-products to commercial or government customers in their fields.
Examples include companies selling satellites, launches, or satellite services. This group
includes emerging launch companies who are developing launch vehicles and services.
Companies in Tier 2 provide major components and/or systems to Tier 1 companies.
Components provided are complex and are significant parts of the end-product.
Examples of products made by Tier 2 companies include satellite antennas and solid
rocket boosters. Tier 3 companies provide less complex components, sub assemblies,
structures, and materials. These companies also provide engineering, information
technology, research, and custom fabrication services. A breakout of companies by
sector (i.e. launch services, satellite manufacturing, etc.) could provide some additional
insights to understand the health of the space industry; however, this is not the case for
this research because many respondent companies contributed to more than a single space
industry segment. Where appropriate, respondents provided data for each year from 2003
to 2006 along with estimates for 2007.
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In reviewing the BIS survey instrument, six survey items were selected which
were best aligned with the indicators of innovation described in Chapter II or provided
some context relating to foreign competition and export controls in the space industry.
The selected survey items are included in Appendix B. BIS provided the data for these
items categorized according to the tier levels. All other identifiable names or references
were removed to protect the anonymity of the respondents. The tier-level categorization
is necessary for the current research because of the previously stated need to focus on
lower-tier firms. Specific survey items relating to indicators of innovation are #5-SpaceRelated Defense & Non-Defense Sales, #20-Financials – Balance Sheet, and #22Research and Development. Item #5 provided both domestic and foreign sales
information for each year. Item #20 specifically included a line requesting an annual
value for “Intangibles” which refers to patents, trademarks, and goodwill. Item #22
requested expenditure values for basic research, applied research, and product
development, as well as amounts from funding sources such as internal, federal
government, state or local government, U.S. private entity (industry, universities, and
other non-governmental organizations), or foreign investors. The data from this item is
an indicator of a firm’s investment in innovation, as per Chapter II.
The survey items providing contextual information are #8-Reasons for Foreign
Sourcing, #11-Foreign Competitors, and #18-Competitiveness Factors and Industry
Outlook. Information from items #8 and #11 could provide insight as to whether foreign
sources have better technologies, quality, or prices. Item #18 provides additional insights
into the industry’s ability to compete in foreign markets, such as barriers to entry.
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Analysis.
This analysis of the BIS data identifies trends and correlations related to the key
themes of innovation and export controls. It also provides an opportunity to consider any
alternate explanations, such as political, economic, or environmental events, which may
have affected innovation in the space industry. Much of the data provided by BIS
included text comments requiring coding to group them into categories using the same
method as in Part I. The large sample size used in the BIS survey proved beneficial as a
few significant themes surfaced through the analysis despite some variation in the
responses.

Part III: Comparison Analysis
The purpose of the final part of this research was to compare the perceptions
gathered from Part I with the quantitative data gathered from the analyzed data of Part II.
The survey data present a numbers-based picture of the state of innovation in the space
industry. The perceptions from government and industry space leaders are based on
personal experiences and instincts they have developed through years of participation in
the space enterprise. The dynamic nature of space technology development and
innovation in the last forty years provides a rich background on which many space
leaders can base their perceptions. Part III of this analysis examines whether the
perceptions agree with the survey data and explore possible trends that the U.S. industry,
as well as U.S. policy makers, should consider regarding current export control policies.
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Summary
The methodology for this research uses a three-part approach. It includes a
qualitative analysis of data collected from interviews of industry experts to determine
existing perceptions, a secondary analysis of data collected from a recent survey to
quantify the state of space innovation, and a comparison of the perceptions with the
survey data to explore the relationship between ITAR and innovation in the U.S. space
industry.
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IV. Results and Analysis

This chapter presents the results and analysis of the research according to the
framework of the research methodology established in Chapter III. The first section
provides a comprehensive qualitative evaluation of the interview data collected to
establish the prevailing perceptions from the Space Enterprise. The second section
provides an analysis of the 2006 survey data obtained from the Department of
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security. Finally, the interview and survey data are
combined in a comparison analysis to provide conclusions about the relationship between
ITAR and innovation in the space industry.

Perceptions from the Space Enterprise
The interview data was coded using content analysis, as described in Chapter III,
to organize the raw responses into dominant themes with supporting concepts. Because
of the open-ended nature of the interviews, responses are not categorized by each specific
question asked. However, the responses fit into four themes that structure this analysis.
The themes are “Effects of ITAR on Innovation in the Space Industry,” “Evolution of the
Space Industry with Current Export Control System,” “Recommendations to Improve
Innovation in the Space Industry,” and “Additional Insights for Innovation in the Space
Industry.” Though the sample size is small, the data collected is an appropriate
representation of perspectives from the space community based on information gathered
in the literature review.
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Effects of ITAR on Innovation in the Space Industry.
The primary goal of this research is to explore the effects of ITAR on innovation
in the space industry. Respondents were directly asked to provide their perceptions of
this topic. The following paragraphs explain the most common responses in addition to a
few of the unique responses. In general, respondents said that ITAR makes U.S.
companies less competitive in the global space market. It inhibits our competitive stance
throughout the world by restricting the sale of components or technologies that are
readily available from other sources. The effects mentioned may pertain to innovation,
changes to business approaches, or unintended consequences. Table 3 summarizes the
specific groupings of responses discussed in this section.
Table 3: Effects of ITAR on Innovation in the Space Industry
Concept
Increases costs - High cost for compliance
Timelines too long
Difficult to understand the rules
Hassle - too hard to work with the process
Little/No effect on innovation
Encourage foreign competition
Unable to market/sell to foreign
Stalls communication/sharing knowledge
Withdraw from space industry
Weak business case
Avoid risk

# of
Responses
9
8
7
7
7
6
5
5
4
2
1

% of
Respondents
52.94
47.06
41.18
41.18
41.18
35.29
29.41
29.41
23.53
11.76
5.88

*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses in the interviews; respondents cited multiple answers

The most commonly mentioned (52% of respondents) effect of ITAR is that it
increases costs for space products and services. Working in a restricted market drives
costs up. The primary cause for this is the high cost of compliance. Companies end up
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paying lawyers to figure out how to comply with ITAR. They must also pay fees to the
government for compliance. Registration alone is difficult for small businesses. A
company must invest significant effort and funds to maintain a compliance program. Due
to the uniqueness of space missions, companies are not able to benefit from an economy
of scale. These factors add cost and overhead to any contract, making it difficult to meet
an international price point.
Approximately half of the total responses to this question refer to longer timelines
resulting from ITAR requirements. The export licensing process takes too long. Many
acknowledge that the U.S. has superior technology, but customers may not be willing to
go through the involved process of licensing and subsequently choose to avoid the
substantial waiting period. Congress must also process the licensing request if the sale is
above a certain dollar threshold, which most space programs typically exceed.
Congress’s process can average approximately three months in addition to the standard
licensing process. Furthermore, ITAR reduced the ability to make quick deals. It is
difficult for U.S. companies to accommodate the quicker timelines that foreign customers
desire.
Over 40% of the respondents commented that ITAR has little or no effect on
innovation. The impact of ITAR is not necessarily in the area of innovation. They
explain that there is much innovation in the industry; however, ITAR complaints emerge
when trying to market outside of the U.S. or when looking for a launch provider. Some
companies do not consider ITAR until after something is invented. ITAR’s effect on
marketing is a concept that was mentioned by 29% of respondents. The market is more
restricted for lower-tier businesses. For example, a Tier 3 company can sell to Tier 1 and
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2 businesses, but it is harder for them to sell to foreign customers. There are many
innovative companies in the U.S., but a restricted market drives costs up and pushes the
improvement cycle out. ITAR may cause the innovation process to take a little longer
while trying to stay within the rules for communication. This is related to the concern of
29% of respondents that ITAR affects communication and knowledge sharing. ITAR
hinders free technical exchange between a company and foreign engineers because a
license is required before the communication can happen. When marketing to overseas
customers, a company is able to share only a very limited amount of information, which
makes their marketing efforts ineffective. Innovation can also occur when knowledge
from others is shared or imported. ITAR prevents the sharing of knowledge, which
means the U.S. is not always able to know about others’ technologies. The U.S. is unable
to benefit from this input to innovation.
Respondents also expressed great frustration with the hassles of the ITAR
process. ITAR has reduced the ability to make quick deals because of the timeliness of
the licensing process and requirements such as requiring a purchase order in order to get
a license. A license may have many restrictions making it difficult to conduct productive
anomaly resolution, the process of analyzing the cause of, and recovering from, hazards
to a space mission. ITAR hassles also turn away potential foreign customers. Europe
and others are moving away from ITAR components because of the hassle of third-party
transfers. They also choose not to buy from the U.S. because of the possibility of DoS
disallowing the transaction because of U.S. priorities.
Much of the frustration experienced by the space industry is due to a lack of
understanding of the rules. This is one of the biggest hurdles for small businesses. One
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respondent referred to a paranoia that causes companies to protect their technology
needlessly under ITAR. They need to be educated on the licensing process to overcome
the fear or ignorance of the unknown. Some of the confusion happens because it is
difficult to determine when space technology is munitions. One respondent stated that
industry must be cognizant of consequences and risks of illicit trade and nefarious enduse. Another respondent commented that the best you can do is to be diligent and
sincere in trying to comply.
According to 35% of respondents, an unintended effect of ITAR is that it
encourages foreign competition. Since the U.S. cannot export many space technologies,
foreign governments are investing in their own R&D. On the same note, ITAR caused
some companies to move offshore to work around the rules thus driving research outside
the U.S. As a result, there are many products and high-tech resources competing with
U.S. technologies. One respondent mentioned that India thanked the U.S. for ITAR
because it enabled development of their indigenous space capability.
As a secondary effect, companies may modify their business approach. Three of
the concepts mentioned by respondents indicate this behavior. Because companies are
limited to the domestic market, they are more likely to avoid risk in developing new
technologies in order to provide mission assurance. When considering opportunities
beyond the domestic market, companies must balance the cost of complying with ITAR
with the expected return. Companies may question the worth of staying in the space
industry. This leads to companies choosing to withdraw either from individual projects
or from the industry altogether. The punitive threat of violating ITAR is so great that
some companies are unwilling to risk questioning if ITAR applies. They usually assume
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that ITAR does apply and walk away from the business opportunity. In some cases,
companies choose to abandon the space industry and transition their technologies to a
different industry. In addition, many times larger companies that do not necessarily have
a focus on innovation acquire small companies.
Evolution of the Space Industry with Current Export Control System.
Looking to the future, respondents considered how the space industry would
evolve if there was no change to the U.S.’s approach toward export controls. The
dominant concept, mentioned by almost half of all respondents, was that of a continued
drawdown of U.S. suppliers (see Table 4). Considering the number of U.S. suppliers in
the industry has decreased since 1999, there is a threat that suppliers will not survive
because manufacturers choose to rely on imported goods. Companies consider leaving
the space industry if there is a lack of market base and look towards shifting their
business lines from space to other industries, such as medical or energy. This can lead to
a death spiral for critical technologies in the U.S. where there may no longer be as many
satellites built domestically. As a result, there is a potential secondary effect on the
domestic launch capability – if there are fewer satellites built in the U.S. there is less need
for U.S. launches, and U.S. space launch may slowly disappear, or in a best case, may
provide a diminished capability.
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Table 4: Evolution of the Space Industry with Current Export Control System
Concept
# of
% of
Responses
Respondents
Continued drawdown of U.S. suppliers
8
47.06
Dependence on defense/government support
3
17.65
Continued increase in costs
3
17.65
Hassle - too hard to work with the process
2
11.76
Longer timelines
2
11.76
Lost business opportunities
1
5.88
More foreign competition
1
5.88
Push reform of export controls
1
5.88
*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses in the interviews; respondents cited multiple answers

Related to supplier drawdown, 17% of respondents commented on the industry’s
high dependence on government support. Some may argue that the U.S. space industry is
only lingering because of defense and government support. Since the DoD and other
government agencies are the principal customers of the space industry, ITAR comes into
play for many business opportunities outside the U.S., resulting in less export
opportunities. With a limited domestic commercial market base and limited opportunities
to export, the U.S. government will have to fund and manage the U.S. space industrial
base to keep it alive.
Respondents expect that under current export controls, costs will continue to
increase. Companies pass the high cost of ITAR compliance to customers through higher
cost of products and additional overhead costs on contracts. Respondents (11.76%) also
expect that innovation will continue, but will require more planning and coordination due
to the hassle of dealing with ITAR and long timelines required in the licensing process.
There were several other expectations mentioned by respondents. More foreign
competition is likely because other countries will continue their technology development
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to meet their own needs. U.S. companies will likely have many lost business
opportunities due to ITAR restrictions or choosing to walk away from potential sales to
avoid ITAR hassles. Finally, the evolving global economy along with ITAR frustrations
will increase momentum for reform of export controls.
Recommendations to Improve Innovation in the Space Industry.
The majority of recommendations provided by respondents to improve innovation
in the space industry related to ITAR. This most likely occurred because respondents
recognized the overall context of this research focuses on ITAR. In any case, 23 of the
28 recommendations (82%) suggested changes to various aspects of ITAR (see Table 5).
The most popular recommendation (41%) was to review and revise the USML. Despite
the frustration caused by ITAR, respondents unanimously agree that ITAR is necessary
for national security. However, the majority of them also suggest there needs to be a
review of ITAR and the USML with a focus on determining what really requires
protection. This should be done by convening an industry-government consortium
consisting of technically astute developers to identify the important technologies or items
to be protected. There is support for removing satellite components from the USML with
some exceptions. One respondent suggests creating three categories of technologies: (1)
“in the world” – no protection is needed for these technologies; (2) “just beyond the state
of the world” – not militarily critical technology; and (3) “critical military or intelligence
technology” – by capability, not parts. Further, the government must develop a process
to periodically review and update the list every year to 18 months. The recommendation
(17%) to transfer items between the USML and the CCL closely relates to revising the
USML. When reviewing the USML for updates, it may be determined that some
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technologies still need protection, though not under ITAR. Depending on the situation,
these technologies can be transferred to the CCL to be protected under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Commerce.
Table 5: Recommendations to Improve Innovation in the Space Industry
Concept
ITAR: Review/revise USML
ITAR: Update/re-focus export controls
ITAR: Clarify/simplify ITAR language
ITAR: Transfer between USML & CCL
ITAR: Streamline/shorten licensing process
Encourage communication
Provide more government funding
Total

# of
Responses
7
6
4
3
3
3
2
28

% of
Respondents
41.18
35.29
23.53
17.65
17.65
17.65
11.76

*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses in the interviews; respondents cited multiple answers

Next, there is a need to update and re-focus export controls (35%). The
government has some responsibility through policy regulation to mitigate risks to security
and manage commerce in a way that preserves the viability of the industrial base. The
main concern should be to keep the technological lead rather than protecting specific
parts. ITAR should not restrict scientists and engineers from participating in anomaly
resolution when it is in the U.S.’s best interest. Updates should include applying
conditions that are more creative than just saying “no.”
Respondents (23%) also suggest that the ITAR language requires clarification or
simplification so that companies can have a better understanding of the rules. Currently,
interpretation of the law seems to be a matter of opinion; a rational interpretation is
necessary to aid in clarifying the rules for export controls. One respondent suggests
putting definitions into ITAR that would clarify what the Department of Commerce
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controls and what the State Department controls. Another suggestion is to include a list
of specific exclusions so that companies do not need to submit a license request for all
export items. One respondent commented, “While simplicity of language is an extremely
important aspect of communication, there is no substitution for training and education to
translate national policy into reality.”
Another recommendation is to streamline or shorten the licensing process. A
common complaint has been the time it takes to get an export license. As stated earlier, it
is neither a predictable nor a timely process, making it difficult for companies to compete
in the global market. One respondent suggests improving the Technical Assistance
Agreement (TAA) process by granting a general license rather than requiring the
submission of specific questions.
Additionally, there are two recommendations to improve innovation in the space
industry that do not necessarily relate to ITAR. The first recommendation is to
encourage more communication. In the context of this research, this includes
collaboration with foreign governments, companies, or individuals. Collaboration
enables innovation by learning more through interaction with others. One respondent
suggests innovation is more likely to occur by having a large number of small groups
looking at a similar problem. This may indicate support for having more lower-tier and
small businesses in the space industrial base. It also considers the inclusion of foreign
groups in innovative problem-solving. In any case, more freedom of communication is
necessary as it encourages innovation.
The other non-ITAR recommendation is to provide more government funding.
Programs to support Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) could
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encourage a more innovative culture. Government investments in development could
support the U.S. industrial base and enable competition with foreign suppliers.
Additional Insights for Innovation in the Space Industry.
In addition to the perceptions and recommendations provided, respondents
provided some additional insights to consider when analyzing innovation in the space
industry. The following paragraphs discuss the concepts summarized in Table 6.

Table 6: Additional Insights for Innovation in the Space Industry
Concept
Limited access to best talent
Foreign approach to export controls differs from U.S.
Government R&D funding to stimulate innovation
Understanding economics of sociopolitical environment
Appropriate contracting process
Encouraging space tourism
Cultural shift for youth

# of
Responses
6
6
5
4
2
2
1

% of
Respondents
35.29
35.29
29.41
23.53
11.76
11.76
5.88

*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses in the interviews; respondents cited multiple answers

Many believe there is a limited pool of talent available for space technologydevelopment projects that may in turn affect the innovation potential in the space
industry. It appears that some of the best and brightest individuals choose to work in
other industries offering higher salaries or greater prestige. Several respondents
acknowledged that for some projects the best talent might be foreign nationals. In such
cases, ITAR restricts their participation in the space industry. Some companies will not
even consider foreign talent for space projects. In any case, many foreign students,
possibly some of the hardest working, are educated in some of the best universities in the
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U.S. Upon graduation, many of these students will not find employment in the U.S.; they
return to their homelands and contribute to the growing competition around the globe.
The approach of foreign nations, more specifically Europe, towards space export
controls differs from that of the U.S. The U.S. is the only government that controls the
export of space technology unilaterally. Export controls of other nations are not as
restrictive as ITAR, allowing foreign competitors to market their goods and services
freely to the U.S. and other customers. Focusing on Europe’s technological
advancement, one respondent referred to the goal which Jean-Jacques Dordain had when
he became the Director General of the European Space Agency (ESA) in 2003 – to be
equal to or better than the U.S. In support of this goal, Dordain had an R&D budget
dedicated to closing that gap. In addition, ESA’s structure is set up as a single
organization to combine and focus the efforts and resources of all its member states. This
is something the U.S., just one nation with many space goals and priorities, does not
seem able to accomplish.
Twenty-nine percent (29%) of respondents agree that the U.S. Government is
concerned with the state of the industrial base; there are several programs already
established to stimulate innovation and growth in the industrial base. These include the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, the R&D tax credit, and other
funds for R&D. Some respondents questioned whether these programs are really on track
to help the industry. There has been a decrease in funding for science nationally; this is
not a good sign for R&D in the space industry that, as stated, depends primarily on
government funds. One respondent specifically mentioned the R&D tax credit as a good
incentive to stimulate R&D in U.S. companies. However, it is difficult for industry to
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plan for and rely on this credit because it is a temporary measure, thus many companies
do not take advantage of it. The SBIR program targets small businesses with
technological potential and supports them in one or two phases of a three-phase process
to commercialize their innovations. Unfortunately, some companies participating in this
program struggle to make it to the third phase, which does not receive funding from the
government. Many times companies become entirely dependent on government funding
and never look beyond government work.
Another concept mentioned by 23% of respondents refers to global sociopolitical
concerns. One respondent suggests that we have a closed market. For example, we
cannot sell to Arab nations because we do business with Israel; India does not buy from
other nations; space business with China is restricted. Still, global business opportunities
should be encouraged because economic competition is essential for national security.
Thus, ITAR licensing decisions should consider both economic competition and national
security. Economic competition, as opposed to military conflict, encourages more
innovation.
The way contracts are executed in the space industry may also have some effect
on innovation. Because many contracts usually include cutting-edge technology
development, it is common to see “cost-plus” contracts awarded to prime contractors.
This option minimizes the cost risk for the contractor. However, one respondent
mentioned that sometimes the prime contractors arrange “fixed-price” contracts with
lower-tier companies and small businesses, which is not appropriate for development
projects. These lower-tier companies and small businesses assume more cost risk and
may not be willing to push their more innovative ideas. Another complaint suggests that
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the government contracting process is too complex and burdensome for small businesses.
One respondent asserts the DoD should put forth more of an effort to make its
procurement practices friendlier to small businesses that do not have teams of attorneys
to help them navigate the process. This would enable the more innovative portion of the
industry to continue to provide products and services to the government.
Government requirements drive much of the space industry. However, a push for
more commercial space ventures would create more innovative opportunities.
Commercial space can drive innovation, particularly in space tourism, according to 11%
of respondents. One respondent likens the commercial space technology movement to
the early computer movement, where the government contributed the majority of
investments early, which established the infrastructure. As the relevant technologies
became more refined, the computer industry expanded and now individual consumers
worldwide, rather than government-funded projects, drive the computer industry. Space
tourism has the potential to evolve in the same way. The government has made a
significant investment in space technologies. Now, savvy entrepreneurs are making
innovative efforts to improve technologies for launch and human transportation in space.
Perhaps a more fitting comparison may be commercial air transportation, where
eventually the average person will be able to travel in and through space just as easily as
traveling between continents on Earth.
One respondent mentioned a very interesting perspective on modern day
innovation. He suggests we are in the midst of a “cultural shift” because of our youth’s
exposure to technology at a younger level. Children learn the STEM subjects earlier;
however, they also need to be taught problem solving, which does not necessarily happen
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in the classroom. Adults need to encourage children to be innovative. For example,
children 50 years ago found a stick, a ball, and makeshift bases to play a rough version of
baseball, while today’s children are provided the standard equipment, a baseball field,
and coaches – there is no need to think outside the proverbial “box.” Society should
emphasize both STEM education and problem solving skills to encourage innovative
thinking.

Space Innovation Survey Analysis
The Commerce Department’s survey data used for this research is grouped in two
categories, context and innovation indicators. The analysis of the context sets the
background for the relationship to export controls such as ITAR. Then a discussion of
the indicators of innovation follows to understand the state of innovation in the space
industry.
Context for foreign competition and export controls.
Survey item #8 asked respondents to identify all the reasons for procuring
products or services from foreign vendors. Response options were as follows: Better
quality, Not made in the U.S., Less expensive, Better technology, Business relationship,
Trade offset, Service after sale, Foreign subsidies, Customer preference, and Other. The
responses selected most frequently were: Not made in the U.S. (19.18%), Less expensive
(17.89%), Better technology (15.52%), Business relationship (14.66%), and Other
(12.93%). Table 7 presents this information – each column of data reflects the frequency
of the reason in each Tier group. For example, 17 Tier 1 companies, 39 Tier 2
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companies, and 33 Tier 3 companies listed ‘Not made in the U.S.’ as a reason for foreign
sourcing. These numbers, when combined, represent 19.18% of all responses in all tiers.

Table 7: Reasons for Foreign Sourcing
Reason
Not made in the US
Less expensive
Better technology
Business relationship
Other
Customer Preference
Better Quality
Service After Sale
Trade Offset
Foreign Subsidies
Total

# Responses

% Responses

89
83
72
68
60
39
34
17
1
1

19.18%
17.89%
15.52%
14.66%
12.93%
8.41%
7.33%
3.66%
0.22%
0.22%
100%
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# Responses by Tier
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
17
19
10
10
5
5
2
0
0
0

39
41
25
35
30
14
17
5
0
0

33
23
37
23
25
20
15
12
1
1

*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers. Total # of
respondents in Tiers: Tier 1 = 40, Tier 2 = 82, Tier 3 = 80

Approximately half of “Other” responses mention that there is no known
domestic source available. This adds more weight to the top response – Not made in the
U.S. This could indicate an opportunity for U.S. companies to establish a domestic
source. However, the business case may not be worth the effort and resources required
unless the company could compete globally.
Survey item #11 asked respondents to list the top ten directly competing foreign
products or services and to specify which factors make the foreign producers competitive.
The eleven listed factors are as follows: Cost, Product performance, Product quality,
Access to raw materials, Bonus features/services, Delivery time/scheduling, Foreign
exchange, Export licensing requirements, Trade/offset arrangements/subsidies, Ability to
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pay bribes/kickbacks, and Other. Each respondent listed ten items resulting in 2022
items with competitiveness factors. The Top 5 factors making foreign producers’
products competitive (see Table 8) are Export licensing requirements (listed 256 times),
Cost (154), Trade/offset arrangements/subsidies (87), Product performance (84), and
Other (76). The most common reason listed under “Other” was a Preference for
indigenous/domestic sources or capabilities (listed 32 times for Tiers 2 & 3).

Table 8: Top Five Factors for Competitive Foreign Products
Factor

# of
occurrences
256
Export licensing requirements
154
Cost
87
Trade/offset arrangements/subsidies
84
Product performance
76
Other

% of total
responses
12.66
7.62
4.30
4.15
3.76

*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers

Survey item #18 contained five sub-questions and considered competitiveness
factors in the space industry. Specifically, the survey item looked at companies’ past and
planned actions to improve their competitiveness, possible U.S. Government actions to
improve their competitiveness, effects of government expenditures, and barriers to entry
in foreign countries. The question regarding government expenditures did not provide
relevant inputs for this research and therefore is not discussed. There were 183 responses
to survey item #18; some responses included multiple actions. Respondents were asked
for actions taken in the last five years as well as actions they plan to take in the next five
years to improve competitiveness. For both periods, the top three actions are (see Tables
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9 and 10): technology and product development, process improvements, and managing
costs. Some ITAR-related actions appeared for the previous five-year period and focused
mainly on hiring or training ITAR expertise. However, plans for the next five years
included more attention towards improving competitiveness by overcoming or “working
around” ITAR restrictions. Some examples of actions planned to take include
repackaging product lines to remove ITAR restrictions, lobbying to revise ITAR,
acquiring or merging with foreign companies to establish a foreign affiliate not subject to
ITAR restrictions, and at the extreme, withdrawing from or avoiding space-related
business.

Table 9: Past Actions (Last Five Years) to Improve Competitiveness
Action
Technology and product development
Process improvements
Manage costs
Train/hire ITAR expertise

# of
occurrences
32
27
27
2

% of total
responses
17.49
14.75
14.75
1.09

*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers

Table 10: Future Plans (Next Five Years) to Improve Competitiveness
Action
Technology and product development
Process improvements
Manage costs
ITAR-related actions

# of
occurrences
39
29
18
8

% of total
responses
21.31
15.85
9.84
4.37

*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers
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With regard to government actions, respondents provided suggestions for changes
the Federal Government could implement to improve their competitiveness. The
overwhelming majority (52%) of suggestions referred specifically to ITAR or export
controls (see Table 11). The most common suggestion was to review the USML and
remove items from the list. One respondent commented that the “U.S. has too many
restrictions for potential friendly government purchasers making it a better choice for
them to select a non-U.S. supplier.” The subsequent most common suggestions were to
improve throughput times for TAA and export licenses and to streamline licensing
procedures.

Table 11: Suggested U.S. Government Actions to Improve Competitiveness
Action

# of
occurrences
ITAR-related responses
95
Review/remove items from USML
27
Improve throughput time for licenses
19
Streamline licensing procedures
14

% of total
responses
51.91
14.75
10.38
7.65

*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers

The most insightful part of this survey item was the request for the five most
significant barriers companies face when attempting to market products in foreign
countries. The most common barrier listed is ITAR and export controls, cited in 162
responses (see Table 12). ITAR was as a barrier for 23 of the 30 countries mentioned in
the numerous responses. Another common barrier is a foreign country’s bias toward its
own domestic suppliers.
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Table 12: Barriers to Entry in Foreign Countries
Action
ITAR-related responses
Bias toward domestic suppliers
EU limitations on foreign content

# of
occurrences
162
36
5

% of total
responses
88.52
19.67
2.73

*Percentages reflect the frequency of responses; respondents cited multiple answers

Indicators of innovation.
Survey item # 20 (line a) allowed respondents to place a monetary value on
patents and trademarks. The assessment used both business unit and corporate figures.
At least 70 (or 35%) of the 202 respondents recorded "Intangibles" in each financial
reporting year. In any given year, the average value of "Intangibles" was two to three
times the "Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E)" line item. This shows that
companies that provided a response for this line considered “Intangibles,” which includes
intellectual property such as patents and trademarks, to be very valuable. However, the
larger percentage of respondents did not provide data for this line, which could indicate
“Intangibles” are a low priority for many companies. It is also possible that companies
did not provide this information because it may be proprietary. Within this reported
figure, there was no further breakout of values for patents or trademarks. Also, tier
breakouts were not provided for this survey item.
In survey item #5, respondents provided information on their domestic and
foreign sales in the space business from 2003 to 2007. Across all three tiers and spanning
the five year period, foreign sales accounted for a very small percentage of total sales.
Tier 1 foreign sales averaged 8.85% of total sales, Tier 2 averaged 7.10%, and Tier 3
averaged 5.67% (See Table 13). This indicates that U.S. companies have limited
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participation in the global market. It is interesting to note that there was an
approximately 3% drop in foreign sales for Tier 1 companies from 2003 to 2004 and a
second approximately 3% drop from 2004 to 2005. Tier 2 companies also showed a
slight decrease in foreign sales while Tier 3 foreign sales remained consistent. From
2005 to 2007, all Tiers showed an increase in foreign sales. The reason for the decrease in
percentage of foreign sales was not directly part of the scope of this research; however, a
possible explanation is that an increase in foreign innovation has created more
competition for U.S. products and services, offering other options from which foreign
customers can choose.
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*2007 data are estimates

2003
Foreign Sales ($M)
3744
Domestic Sales ($M) 31948
Total Sales ($M)
35692
Foreign % of Total
10.49
Average Foreign %

All Tiers
2004 2005 2006
3176 2691 3942
36966 43545 47346
40142 46236 51288
7.91 5.82 7.69
8.28
2007
3392
32375
35767
9.48

2003
3159
23400
26559
11.89

2004
2573
27234
29807
8.63

Tier 1
2005
1994
32169
34163
5.84
8.85
2006
2825
35506
38331
7.37

2007
2363
20108
22471
10.52

2003
511
7133
7644
6.68

Tier 2
2004 2005 2006 2007 2003
520 600 995 894 75
8175 9646 10066 10335 1414
8695 10246 11061 11229 1489
5.98 5.86 9.00 7.96 5.04
7.10

2004
83
1557
1640
5.06

Tier 3
2005
97
1729
1826
5.31
5.67

2006
122
1774
1896
6.43

2007
134
1933
2067
6.48

Table 13: Space Related Foreign and Domestic Sales

Survey item #22 solicited R&D expenditures supporting space-related activities.
Respondents reported these values in four categories: Basic Research, Applied Research,
Product Development, and Process Development. R&D expenditures are primarily
targeted towards Basic Research (42.1%) and Product Development (34.3%), followed
by Applied Research (21.5%) and only minimal investment in Process Development
(2.1%) (see Table 14). Of note, survey data shows that R&D expenditures increased an
average of 8% per year from 2003 to 2006.

Table 14: Space R&D Expenditures by Year

Basic Research
Applied Research
Product Development
Process Development
Total

2003
($M)
713
354
721
50
1838

2004
($M)
788
477
646
48
1959

2005
($M)
963
474
672
34
2143

2006
($M)
991
460
775
43
2269

Total
($M)
3455
1765
2814
175
8209

% of Total
R&D
42.1%
21.5%
34.3%
2.1%
100%

Table 15 shows Space R&D expenditures by Tier. Tier 2 expenditures account for
almost half (47.6%) of total R&D expenditures. Tier 1 was responsible for 24.8% of the
total while Tier 3 conducted slightly more R&D expenditures at 27.5%. This evidence
supports the idea discussed in Chapter II that the lower tiers (specifically Tier 2) are a
significant source of innovation.
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Table 15: Space R&D Expenditures by Tier
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Total
($M)
($M)
($M) ($M)
789
1627
1040
3456
Basic Research
750
808
207
1765
Applied Research
456
1396
961
2813
Product Development
44
79
54
177
Process Development
3910
2262
8211
Total 2039
% of Total R&D 24.8% 47.6% 27.5% 100%

Respondents also provided figures for funding received from the following
identified sources: Parent Company (Internal), Federal Government, State and Local
Government, U.S. Private Entity, Foreign Investors, and Other. The two primary sources
are Internal and the Federal Government, each providing approximately 50% of the total
R&D funding (see Table 16). The remaining sources combined provided only
approximately 1% of the total. The substantial percentage of investment for R&D from
internal sources combined with government sources may be considered a strong indicator
of innovation.

Table 16: Funding Sources
2003
Funding Source Actual % of Annual
Total
50.42%
Parent/Internal/ $ 965
IRAD
$ 927
48.43%
Federal
Government
$ 22
1.15%
Other

2004
2005
2006
Cumulative
Actual % of Annual Actual % of Annual Actual % of Annual Total
% of
Total
Total
Total
Total
$1,005
48.06%
$ 1,218
53.75%
$ 1,271
52.18%
$ 4,459
51%
$1,061

50.74%

$ 1,015

44.79%

$ 1,130

46.39%

$ 4,133

47%

$

1.20%

$

1.46%

$

1.44%

$

1%

25
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33

35

115

As mentioned in Chapter II, the most frequently used proxy for measuring
innovation is R&D expenditures, and is typically expressed as a proportion of sales.
Combining the data for survey items #22 and #5 provides the ratio of R&D expenditures
as a percentage of total space sales (see Table 17).

Table 17: R&D Expenditures as % of Total Space Sales

Tier 1 (IRAD)
Tier 1 (Gov't)
Tier 2 (IRAD)
Tier 2 (Gov't)
Tier 3 (IRAD)
Tier 3 (Gov't)

2003
(%)
0.43
1.03
6.53
5.86
24
14

2004
(%)
0.47
1.43
5.88
4.75
22
13

2005
(%)
0.44
1.11
6.78
4.14
20
12

2006
(%)
0.42
1.01
6.75
4.68
19
12

Average
Tier
(%)
Average (%)
0.44
1.59
1.15
6.49
11.34
4.86
21.25
34.00
12.75

The average values from 2003 to 2006 are: Tier 1 = 1.59%, Tier 2 = 11.34%, Tier 3 =
34%. The ratio of internal Independent Research and Development (IRAD) as a
percentage of total space sales averaged as follows: Tier 1 = 0.44%, Tier 2 = 6.49%, Tier
3 = 21.25%. These percentages indicate a greater potential for innovation to occur in
Tier 2 and Tier 3 firms. The data also show the Tier 3 percentages decreasing over the
recorded period; this could be an indication of decreasing innovation.

Comparison Analysis
This section pulls together the perceptions from the interviews and the
quantitative analysis gathered from the survey data. There are several key concepts that
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correlate between the two data sources. There are no apparent disagreements between the
data sources – the survey data supports the majority of interview respondents’ comments.
The following paragraphs summarize the key concepts.
The most obvious relationship between the interview data and the survey data is
the agreement on recommendations to improve ITAR. The fact that ITAR-related
responses emerged more frequently in both contexts signifies that ITAR appears to have
an influence on competitiveness and innovation. The top recommendations reported in
both Tables 5 and 11 are to revise the USML and to streamline the licensing process.
Though these recommendations may not have a direct impact on innovation, they may
improve the competitive environment to stimulate more innovation.
There is also agreement between both data sources on the need to stimulate more
innovation with government funding. As shown in Table 15, Tier 2 companies are
responsible for almost half of the total R&D expenditures for space. In Table 17, data
shows that Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies use more IRAD funding than government
funding. Both of these tables demonstrate the high expectation for innovation to occur at
these tiers. Therefore, if Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies received more government funding,
they would have more resources available with which to be more innovative. The
recommendation to provide more government funding in Table 5 stems from a general
concern that science and technology is a low priority for the federal government. This is
echoed by the additional insight provided by respondents (see Table 6) to consider the
effectiveness of government programs already in place to support R&D.
Another common concern in both data sources is the apparent unintended
consequence of ITAR restrictions – increased foreign competition. The combined effects
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of ITAR, as outlined in Table 3, serve to encourage foreign competition. Foreign
products have become more desirable because ITAR has caused increased costs, longer
timelines, and complicated licensing requirements for U.S. products. These factors are
pushing innovation overseas; foreign customers do not want to deal with these
restrictions. Therefore, they develop their own technologies to provide the same
capabilities. Currently, the high cost for compliance (Table 3) is absorbed into the cost
for space products and services. Foreign sources are able to offer less expensive options
(Table 7) which is one of the top factors (Table 8) making foreign products more
competitive. Interview respondents expect that costs will continue to increase under the
current export control system. However, the greatest deterrent for purchasing U.S.
products is the hassle of dealing with export licensing requirements (Table 8).
Unfortunately, this is not likely to change under the current system of rules (Table 4).
With increased foreign competition and the hassles of the licensing process, ITAR is a
major contributing factor in lower-tier U.S. companies’ decision to withdraw from the
space industry. Subsequently, this diminishes the available resources for innovation in
the space industry.

Summary
The interview data revealed some key themes in the perceptions of participants in
the space industry. These themes were effects of ITAR on innovation in the space
industry, how the space industry will evolve with the current export control system,
recommendations to improve innovation in the space industry, and some additional
insights for innovation in the space industry. The analysis compared concepts within
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these themes with quantitative data gathered from BIS’s 2006 survey. This analysis
presented several key concepts common to both data sources that include
recommendations to improve ITAR, more government funding to stimulate innovation,
and increased foreign competition as an unintended consequence of ITAR.

62

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

The purpose of this research was to explore the connection between ITAR and its
effects on space innovation. This chapter outlines the concluding concepts resulting from
this research. The first section provides the research conclusions as answers to the
research questions. The next section outlines recommendations to consider for potential
government policy revisions. The subsequent section summarizes the limitations of this
study. Finally, the last section proposes future research areas to expand on the current
topic.

Research Conclusions
Based on the comprehensive literature review and the analysis of data from
interviews and the BIS 2006 survey, research conclusions provide are offered as answers
to the investigative questions outlined in Chapter I along with a summary of the
innovation measures outlined in Chapter II.
Research Questions.
1. What are the effects of ITAR restrictions on innovation in the U.S. SIB?
This research did not reveal significant evidence that ITAR has a direct effect on
innovation. The space industry has experienced some negative effects as a result of
ITAR restrictions, such as increased costs due to compliance requirements and increased
timelines due to the lengthy licensing process. These negative effects hinder the ability
to compete in the global market, thus making growth for lower-tier companies difficult to

63

achieve. The industry may expect some secondary negative effects on innovation due to
lower-tier companies abandoning the space industry, leaving a void in its primary source
of innovation. This is already a risk for key technology areas where there are only one or
two domestic suppliers, such as radiation hardened electronics and solar arrays.
Companies specializing in these technology areas may not be able to compete in the
global market due to ITAR restrictions; however, foreign companies are allowed to
compete with them in the US market, making their survival challenging. If a company
remains in the space industry, funds for ITAR compliance activities may be diverted from
funds for internal R&D investments, thus reducing the potential for innovation.

2. Are there any indications that innovation in the SIB is declining since stricter ITAR
restrictions were imposed in 1999? If so, what are they?
The most useful indicators of innovation in the space industry are R&D
expenditures as a percentage of total space sales and U.S. market share data over a tenyear period. The R&D expenditures data revealed a greater potential for innovation to
occur in Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies because of a greater percentage of investment in
R&D. There was a decrease in Tier 3 percentages from 2003 to 2006, which may
indicate a decline in innovation, but a causal relationship cannot be inferred with
certainty.
The market share data reveals a decrease in the U.S. share of global satellite
manufacturing, indicating a potential decline in space innovation. The DoD attributes the
decrease in market share to U.S. export controls and foreign policies to increase
indigenous capabilities (Taylor 2007). Within this context, it is possible to assume that
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U.S. innovation has not changed, but an increase in foreign innovation has caused the
U.S.’s decreased market share of the space industry.

3. What is the perception of the health of innovation in the SIB from space leaders in
government and industry?
The general perception is that innovation in the space industrial base is healthy.
U.S. companies are able to develop products and services to meet the unique needs of
their customers. Interview respondents feel confident in the U.S.’s ability to innovate and
lead the space industry with superior technologies. However, U.S. export control policies
threaten this ability because they limit participation in the global space market.
Respondents expressed concern that innovation in the space industry will suffer if there
are no changes to the current export control system.

Strength of Innovation Measures.
Chapter II outlined six innovation measures to consider in this research. These
are R&D expenditures, Intellectual property, Number of new products introduced,
Percent of sales or profits from new products, U.S. market share of the space industry,
and Global market-share data over several years. Of the six, this research is able to
address four measures. Data collection efforts were unsuccessful in obtaining enough
information to make any judgment regarding the Number of new products introduced and
the Percent of sales or profits from new products.
The survey data and the interview data provided very little insight into the role of
intellectual property in the space industry. For 35% of survey respondents, intellectual
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property is valued highly. Only 23% of interview respondents provided information on
intellectual property. This information did not reveal any dominant opinion towards the
value of intellectual property. Some companies seek to publish technical papers and
apply for multiple patents while others place little to no value on these documented forms
of intellectual property. Other possible explanations are that companies do not want to
share this information, or the respondents did not know the information at the time.
As discussed earlier, Space R&D expenditures from the survey data show that
Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies spend a greater amount as a percentage of total space sales
than Tier 1 companies do. This leads us to assume that lower-tier companies place
greater importance on the ability to innovate. Interview data did not provide any
additional insights into actual expenditures. However, some interview respondents
reiterated the concept that lower-tier companies are a primary source of innovation.
Therefore, protecting this innovation capability should be a high priority for U.S.
policymakers.
The current research did not collect data to discuss U.S. market share of the space
industry and Global market share data over several years. However, the DoD’s defense
industrial base assessment of the U.S. space industry (Taylor 2007) includes some
relevant market share data which was collected by the Satellite Industry Association
(SIA). Based on SIA’s 2004 and 2006 reports, the U.S. share of global satellite
manufacturing has decreased over a ten-year period. U.S. market share was 63% in
1996-1998 and dropped to 52% in 1991-2001 and to 42% in 2002-2006. The DoD’s
report attributes this decrease in market share in part to U.S. export controls as well as
foreign policies to increase indigenous capabilities. Without this context, it is possible to
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assume that the U.S. space industry is becoming less innovative. The more likely
explanation is that U.S. innovation has not changed, but foreign innovation has increased,
resulting in the U.S.’s decreased market share of the space industry. Other explanations
could be that the rate of U.S. space innovation has decreased or that innovation is a
lagging indicator. There was insufficient long-term data available to draw specific
conclusions on the cause of the decreased market share.

Recommendations
The policy implications of this research are not solely for ITAR. A multi-faceted
policy approach could foster more innovation in the U.S. space industry. This research
led to the following recommendations for U.S. policymakers.
The current administration already has efforts underway to investigate potential
reforms for U.S. export policies. Policymakers must tread carefully in these efforts
because changes to export policies can have major effects on national security as well as
U.S. economic growth. The top priority is to determine what to protect and at what level
to protect to ensure U.S. national security. The USML requires review and updates to
account for the current state of space technologies around the world. If an item or a
technology can be removed from the USML, consideration should be given to other
export protection options such as the CCL. Policymakers must also consider how to
implement and enforce protections to avoid causing unnecessary barriers to industry
growth and U.S. economic growth. As stated, this is the primary source of frustration for
space businesses. The Department of State has made efforts to streamline the current
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licensing and TAA processes, but perhaps they should consider replacing the current
process with a new and better process.
In addition to export policy reform, the administration should review government
programs to encourage science and technology in the industrial base. The intent of this
recommendation is not to suggest the government should pay for more innovation.
Rather, the government should structure policies and regulations to minimize obstacles
for small businesses while protecting the rights of U.S. citizens. For example, a
permanent extension of the R&D tax credit would encourage U.S. companies to plan and
invest in long-term research projects. In addition, the government could bolster programs
such as SBIR to target lower-tier businesses and encourage more innovation. However, it
is not enough just to develop a great technology. The true benefit of innovation is in the
implementation of new technologies – this may be where small businesses need more
help.

Limitations of the research
The literature review presented several options for measuring innovation along
with criticisms of some of these options. Though justification was provided for the
measures used in this research, the reader must consider that there are weaknesses
associated with all the measures. They are good indicators of the potential for innovation
to occur, but insufficient to determine the cause of innovation. Therefore, it is difficult to
determine if the transition of jurisdiction for all satellites and satellite technologies to
ITAR (referenced in Chapter I) was the cause for any observed effects on innovation as
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measured in this research. Furthermore, other considerations for a causal analysis could
include:
-

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001

-

The economic outlook for the space industry as well as for the nation

-

A minimal need to replace existing capabilities – perhaps the demand for
space technology has not increased because innovation has been so good and
has provided technologies that do more for longer

-

The possibility that negative effects due to ITAR changes have been
underreported

Another limitation is the use of derivative data. This may be a concern because of
the danger of incorrectly interpreting the information originally collected for a different
purpose.

Future Research
This thesis reveals a need to examine other second or third order effects of ITAR.
It is worth looking into disciplines other than space technology to investigate the effects
of ITAR in economic, social, and political environments. Such studies could advise the
government’s current efforts to reform ITAR. The following paragraphs offer four
suggestions to fill gaps not addressed in this research and further enhance the knowledge
base encompassing the current research.
The current research did not collect data on the number of new products
introduced and the percentage of sales or profits from new products. A follow-on study
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could focus on these measures to gain better insight as to the state of innovation in the
U.S. space industry.
Since this research was unable to clearly identify a direct causal relationship
between ITAR and any significant change in space innovation, subsequent research could
investigate contributing factors to the decrease in U.S. market share of the global space
industry and to what degree these factors contributed.
Further study is necessary to establish concrete measures of innovation. If
measures cannot be generalized to all situations, perhaps a study to present conditions for
determining which measures can be reliably used in various situations. Current
innovation measures indicate the potential for innovation to occur or whether innovation
is actually occurring. However, the literature provides confusing and contradictory
guidance on the validity of these measures.
The broader industry environment could benefit from an investigation of
government policies, laws, and regulations that affect innovation in the U.S. industrial
base. This study should explore whether current policies hinder innovation, distinguish
which policies encourage innovation, and consider which policies can be helpful with
some revisions.

Summary
This chapter presented the concluding thoughts resulting from this research.
There is no significant evidence that ITAR has a direct effect on space innovation.
However, the industry may experience some secondary negative effects on innovation.
Recommendations to policymakers include reforming the overall U.S. export policy
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approach and strengthening government programs that support STEM disciplines.
Though some limitations of this research exist, there are several topics worthy of
consideration for follow-on research efforts.
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Appendix A: Interview Instrument

1. How do you or your business participate in the Space Industrial Base?
2. What are your perceptions of your business’s innovation capability for space
technology?
a. Since 1999, how many patents has your business applied for? Been granted?
b. Since 1999, how many technical papers have been published by members in
your business?
c. Since 1999, how many new ideas/products has your business introduced into
the space market?
d. Since 1999, on average, what was your percent of sales/profits from new
products?
3. What are your perceptions of the effects of ITAR on your business’s innovation
capability for space technology?
4. What are your perceptions of the effects of ITAR on innovation in the space industry?
5. How do you expect the U.S. space industry will evolve with the current system of
export control policy?
6. What other factors do you think affect innovation in the space industry?
7. If you were king/queen for a day, what would you change?
8. Do you have any additional comments regarding ITAR and the space industry?
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Appendix B: Selections from BIS 2006 Survey Instrument
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5.

SPACE-RELATED DEFENSE & NON-DEFENSE SALES

Instructions: Please provide sales data for calendar years 2003-2007 for your defense and non-defense space-related products and/or services.
Note: Total Defense and Non-Defense must equal Total in the right column. The combination of Domestic Sales and Foreign Sales must equal Total Sales
in the bottom row.
2003

2004

(in $ thousands)
NonDefense
Total
Defense

(in $ thousands)
NonDefense
Total
Defense

2005
(in $ thousands)
NonDefense
Total
Defense

Domestic
Sales $

Foreign
Sales $

Total
Sales $

69

2006
(in $ thousands)
NonDefense
Total
Defense

2007 (estimate)
(in $ thousands)
NonTotal
Defense

Defense

8.

REASONS FOR FOREIGN SOURCING

Instructions: For the five products and/or services cited in Question 7.b on “Foreign Procurement”, please identify ALL the reasons your Company/Business Unit
procured these products and/or services from Foreign vendors. If your reason is not included here, provide rationale in the space provided.
Reasons for Procuring Products and/or Services from Foreign Vendors

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Comments:
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in comments
below)

Other (specify

Customer
Preference

Foreign
Subsidies

Service after
Sale

Trade Offset
Arrangement

Business
Relationship

Better
Technology

Less
Expensive

Product/Service
Code
(from
Question 3)

Not Made in
the U.S.

#

Better
Quality

 (Check all that apply)

11.

FOREIGN COMPETITORS – 2003-2006

Instructions: Please list the Top Ten Foreign Products and/or Services (by sales, largest to smallest) that competed directly with your Company’s/Business
Unit’s space-related products and/or services from calendar year 2003-2006. Also, specify what factors make foreign producers’ products competitive
relative to your Company’s/Business Unit’s products.
[For “Code” and “Name” Please use the Product and Service Type Listing in Question 2.]

#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8
#9
#10
Comments:
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Other (specify in
comments below)

Ability to Pay
Bribes/Kickbacks

Trade/Offset
Arrangements/Subsidies

Export Licensing
Requirements

Foreign Exchange

Delivery Time/
Scheduling

Bonus Features/ Services

Country

Access to Raw Materials

Foreign
Company
Name

Product Quality

Foreign
Product Name

Product Performance

Product or
Service Code

Cost

Top Ten Foreign
Products and/or
Services

 (check all that apply)

18.

COMPETITIVENESS FACTORS AND INDUSTRY OUTLOOK
PAST ACTIONS TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS
Comments:

Please describe the actions your Company/Business Unit has taken in the Last
Five Years to improve your competitiveness in the space market?

FUTURE PLANS TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS
Comments:

Please describe the actions your Company/Business Unit plans to take to
improve your competitiveness over the Next Five Years.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
Please indicate what actions, policy changes or regulatory reforms the Federal
Government could implement to improve your Industry’s and/or Company’s/
Business Unit’s overall competitiveness.

Comments:

EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
How have space-related spending and allocations by the U.S. Department of Defense, NASA, NOAA, and other agencies impacted your Company/Business Unit in
the following categories?
Products and Services
Personnel/Staffing
Operations

Response 
Response 
Response 

Please describe the strategies your Company/Business Unit has developed to respond to the above issues.
Response 

BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
#
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Please provide the five most significant barriers to entry faced by your
Company/Business Unit when attempting to market products in foreign
countries. [Note: List in order of relevance/impact; #1 is the most significant
barrier.]
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Country

Barrier to Entry

20.a

FINANCIALS – BALANCE SHEET

Instructions: Organizations that operate as part of a larger company with non-space-related business operations should
provide balance sheet data only for their Space-Related Business. [Please provide estimates if actual figures are not
available.]
Corporate Figures represented below

 Check  here
Business Unit Figures represented below
My Company/Business Unit
operates on a:
 here 

Fiscal Year

2003
Calendar Year

A.

Current Assets (in $ thousands)

1.

Cash

2.

Marketable securities

3.

Accounts receivable, net

4.

Inventories

5.

Prepaid expenses

6.

Other current assets (please specify)
Total current assets

7.

B.
8.

Non-Current Assets (in $ thousands)
Property, plant and equipment
Break-out capital
expenditures. [Do
not double count
PP&E in “Total
Non-Current
Assets.”]

9. - Property
10. - Buildings
11.

- Machinery & Equipment

12.

Investments

13.

Intangibles (patents, trademarks, goodwill)

14.

Less accumulated depreciation
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2004

2005

2006

2007 (est)

15.

Other assets (please specify)

16.

Total non-current assets

17.

Total assets

C.

Liabilities and Owners’ Equity (in $ thousands)

D.

Current Liabilities (in $ thousands)

18.

Accounts payable

19.

Estimated tax liability (e.g., income taxes payable)

20.

Accrued expenses

21.

Long-term debt (current portion) due in 1 year

22.

Other current liabilities (please specify)
Total current liabilities

23.

E.

Non-Current Liabilities (in $ thousands)

25.

Long-term debt (less current portion)

26.

Deferred income taxes

27.

Other long-term liabilities (please specify)

28.

Total non-current liabilities

29.

Total liabilities

F.

Owners’ Equity (in $ thousands)

30.

Common stock

31.

Additional paid-in capital
Total paid-in capital

32.
33.

Retained earnings

34.

Less treasury stock (stock repurchase)

35.

Total owners’ equity

36.

Total Liabilities and Owners’ Equity*

*Note: Please report any significant one-time events on the next page of this survey.
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22.a

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Instructions: Companies/organizations whose sole focus is space-related products should report Corporate-wide R&D
expenditures. Those companies/organizations that are part of a larger company with other non-space-related business
operations should report R&D expenditure figures only at the space-related Business Unit level. Please specify whether
you are reporting Corporate R&D figures or Business Unit R&D figures with a check  in the corresponding box.

SPACE-RELATED R&D – EXPENDITURES BY FUNCTION
Corporate R&D

 check  here

Business Unit R&D
R&D Expenditures Supporting Space-Related Activities
(in $ thousands)

CATEGORY

2003

2004

Basic Research
Applied Research
Product Development
Process Development
Total R&D
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2005

2006

2007 (est.)

22.b

SPACE-RELATED R&D – FUNDING SEGMENT BY SOURCE

Corporate R&D

 check  here

Business Unit R&D
R&D Funding Sources for Space-Related Activities
(in $ thousands)

CATEGORY

2003

2004

Parent Company (internal)
Federal Government
State and Local Government
U.S. Private Entity [Includes industry,
universities, and all other non-governmental
organizations.]
Foreign Investors [Includes private, industry,
governments, and universities.]

Other (please specify in box below)
Total R&D
Other 

Comment 
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2005

2006

2007 (est.)

References
Abbey, G. and N. Lane (2009). United States Policy: Challenges and Opportunities Gone
Astray. Cambridge.
Adams, R., J. Bessant, R. Phelps. (2006). "Innovation management measurement: A
review." International Journal of Management Reviews 8(1): 21-47.
AFRL (2009). Air Force Annual Industrial Base Assessment, Air Force Manufacturing
Technology Division.
Australia Bureau of Statistics (1996). Research and Experimental Development: Business
Enterprises. Canberra.
Bessant, J. and J. Tidd (2007). Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Wiley.
Boucher, M. (2009). "ITAR Reform Legislation in the Works." Retrieved November 13,
2009, from http://nasawatch.com/archives/2009/05/itar-reform-legislation-in-theworks.html.
Business Council of Australia (1993). Managing the Innovating Enterprise. Melbourne,
BCA.
"Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary." (2010) Cambridge Dictionaries Online,
Retrieved January 7, 2010, from
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/innovation.
Chesbrough, H. W. (2003). Open Innovation: the new imperative for creating and
profiting from technology. Boston, Harvard Business School Press.
CSIS (2008). Briefing of the Working Group on the Health of the U.S. Space Industrial
Base and the Impact of Export Controls, Center for Strategic & International
Studies.
Dinerman, T. (2005). "Fixing ITAR: the saga continues." The Space Review, Retrieved
November 13, 2009, from http://www.thespacereview.com/article/374/1.

77

Dinerman, T. (2008). "ITAR's failure." The Space Review, Retrieved November 13,
2009, from http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1086/1.
Foust, J. (2005). "One Nation, Over Regulated: Is ITAR Stalling the New Space Race?"
Ad Astra 17(3).
Futron Corporation (2009). State of the Satellite Industry Report, Satellite Industry
Association.
Knes, M. (2010). "Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls and the
Wassenaar Arangement." Reference for Business, Retrieved January 7, 2010,
from http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Con-Cos/CoordinatingCommittee-for-Multilateral-Export-Controls-and-the-WassenaarArrangement.html.
Kusiolek, R. (2008). "ITAR: Balancing the Global Playing Field?", Retrieved November
13, 2009, from http://www.satellitetoday.com/via/features/23882.html.
NASA. (2007). "Chapter 5. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)." NASA
Export Control Program (NPR 2190.1), Retrieved July 7, 2010, from
http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/.
National Space Policy (2006). U.S. National Space Policy.
NSSO (2008). Barriers to Entry and Sustainability in the U.S. Space Industry, National
Security Space Office.
NSSO. (2010). "NSSO's Strategic Plan." National Security Space Office, Retrieved
February 10, 2010, from
http://www.acq.osd.mil/nsso/organization/organization.htm.
OUSD-ATL. (2009). Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, Office of Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, Industrial Policy
Phillips, R. (1997). Innovation and Firm Performance in Australian Manufacturing.
Canberra, Industry Commission, Staff Research Paper.

78

Rogers, M. (1998). The Definition and Measurement of Innovation. The Performance of
Australian Enterprises: Innovation, Productivity and Profitability. Parkville,
Victoria, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research.
Schumpeter, J. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development Boston, Harvard University
Press.

Space Foundation (2008). ITAR and the U.S. Space Industry. Washington, DC, Space
Foundation.
Space Politics. (2009). "Sherman's march towards ITAR reform." Space Politics
Retrieved December, 2009, from
http://www.spacepolitics.com/2009/04/01/shermans-march-towards-itar-reform/.
Taylor, A. (2007). Defense Industrial Base Assessment: U.S. Space Industry Final
Report. Dayton, OH, Air Force Research Laboratory.
Tidd, J. (2001). "Innovation management in context: environment, organization and
performance." International Journal of Management Reviews 3(3): 169-183.
U.S. Congress (2009). International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 22. C. o. F.
Regulations: 461-569.
U.S. House of Representatives. (1999, January 3, 1999). "U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China." Retrieved
August 13, 2009, from www.house.gov/coxreport/cont/gncont.html.
United Nations (1967). Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies.
Van Atta, R., M. Bittmann, P. Collopy, B. Hartfield, B. Harmon, M. Kaplan, N.
Karvonides, M. Lippitz, J. Mandelbaum, M. Marks, M. Patterson, K. Sullivan.
(2007). Export Controls and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, Institute for
Defense Analyses.

79

Wheatley, M. (2009). "ITAR restrictions hamper America's space industry." Latest
Procurement News, Retrieved November 13, 2009, from
http://www.procurementleaders.com/news/latestnews/itar-hamper-spaceindustry/.

80

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
16-09-2010
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

2. REPORT TYPE
Master’s Thesis

3. DATES COVERED (From – To)
Jun 2009 – Aug 2010
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

Exploring the Effects of International Traffic in Arms Regulations Restrictions on Innovation in
the U.S. Space Industrial Base

5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6.

AUTHOR(S)

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER

Landry, Kalliroi L., Major, USAF

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Way
WPAFB OH 45433-7765

AFIT/GRD/ENV/10-S01

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

AFSPC/A8/9 Plans and Programs
150 Vandenberg St, Suite 1105
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-4020

AFSPC/A8/9
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
14. ABSTRACT
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are used to protect United States (U.S.) military technologies. However, changes to ITAR export
controls regarding space technologies have had a major impact to the U.S. space industry. The literature mentions a concern for the health of lower-tier
firms because they are a major source of innovation, but there is no additional information considering the effects of ITAR on space innovation at those
lower tiers. The purpose of this thesis was to explore the implications of continuing the current ITAR restrictions with regard to innovation in the space
industry. This research used a three-part approach: Part I used personal interviews to explore perceptions from the space enterprise. Part II was a
secondary analysis of previously collected data. Part III compared the results of Parts I and II to assess the relationship between ITAR and innovation in
the space industry. The analysis shows there is no significant evidence that ITAR has a direct effect on space innovation. However, the industry may
see some secondary negative effects on innovation. This thesis reveals a need to examine other second or third order effects of ITAR in economic and
political environments to advise current ITAR reform efforts.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
ITAR, Export Control, Innovation, Space Industry

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a.

REPORT

U

b.

ABSTRACT

U

17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT

c. THIS PAGE

UU
U

18. NUMBER
OF
PAGES
98

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
Lt Col J. Robert Wirthlin (AFIT/ENV)
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
937-785-3636 ext.4650
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

